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This paper estimates country risk using an alternative method to commonly used country 
risk models by the rating agencies. The paper builds on earlier work and tries to identify 
empirically the important factors affecting debt service capacity of borrowing countries. In 
this study we assess the riskiness of 34 developing countries over the period 1986 to 1998 
using a two-limit Tobit model. In the model a-year-ahead debt rescheduling ratios are used as 
the dependent variable. Using the debt rescheduling ratios, we emphasize the role of relative 
sizes of debt rescheduling in predicting external debt crisis. The model is tested for its 
predictability of the external debt crises and the results are compared with the rating of  S&P 
and Moody’s.  A special emphasis is given to the recent Asian crisis and its predictability.  
 
JEL Classification: F34 
Keywords: Sovereign rating; Country risk; Debt crises 
 
1. Introduction 
The external debt crises faced by developing countries have been generating 
concern among creditors and borrowers particularly over the last two decades. After 
the Asian crisis, once again, the growing volume of private commercial loans to 
developing countries has increased concern about the ability of these countries to 
repay external obligations on time.  However, it should be noted that debt service 
difficulties on the part of borrower countries are not a recent development. As a 
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result, demand for sovereign credit ratings and popularity of rating agencies has 
increased dramatically.   
Country risk assessment models or sovereign ratings are quite beneficial to all 
the parties if they are accurate and able to predict the debt crises in advance. Many 
studies exist to identify factors of country risk. These studies are separated into two 
types: descriptive studies and analytical studies.  The first type of studies are used 
by banks and rating agencies to appraise risk and generally rank borrowers 
according to a large number of selected criterias.  The second type of studies utilize 
statistical methods to understand debt rescheduling decision.  Frank & Cline (1971), 
Dhonte (1974), Grinols (1976), Feder & Just (1977), Sergen (1977), Mayo & Barret 
(1977), Smith (1977), Saini & Bates (1978), Fisk & Rimlinger (1979), Feder, Just 
& Ross (1981), Cline (1984), Kharas (1984), Edwards (1984), Beltratti (1990), 
Ngassam (1991), Ozler (1992), Hajivassiliou (1987 and 1994), Hernandez-Trillo 
(1995), Gur (1998) are some of the studies of this type attempted to predict the debt 
crises and identify the factors responsible for the debt repayment problems.   
This paper combines both approaches. The determinants of debt rescheduling for 
34 developing countries over the period from 1986 to 1998 is examined by utilizing 
the two-limit Tobit model. After determining the macroeconomic variables and 
fundamental debt ratios affecting the debt repayment capacities and debt 
rescheduling of the sample developing countries,  the estimated debt rescheduling 
ratios are used to determine the country grades similar to rating agencies. The 
model is tested for its predictability of the external debt crises a-year in advance 
with special emphasis given to the recent Asian crisis. In the model, contrary to the 
previous studies, the ratio of the amount of debt rescheduled to the total debt, 
rescheduling ratio, is used as a dependent variable in order to pay attention to the 
relative amount of debt reschedulings over total debt.  
The paper is organized as follows: the first section explains the sample countries, 
their selection criteria, and the data set. Section two explains the explanatory 
variables used in the model. Section three presents the empirical results. Section 
four examines the trends of creditworthiness and accuracy of the model for the 
sample countries. In this section the estimated country risk grades are compared to 
some other available country risk ratings constructed by the rating agencies for 
1997 and 1998 prior to the Asian crises.  Section six provides conclusions.   
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2. The Sample Countries and Data  
This paper studies thirty-four developing countries for the period between 1986 
and 1998. The countries in our sample are Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,  Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.  The sample 
countries have been borrowing significant amounts of external loans from other 
governments, international institutions, commercial banks and other private sources 
over the years. The first criterion for country selection was the availability of 
compatible data for significantly long time periods. The second criterion was the 
amount of external debt stock and the level of external borrowing from commercial 
banks. As a result, many developing countries have been excluded from the analysis 
because either they do not have a significant amount of external debt, especially 
only in the form of small amounts of external loans obtained from the commercial 
banks, or data is unavailable.  
Out of the thirty-four countries that are selected for this study, twenty-four are 
middle income countries and the remaining ten are low income countries as 
categorized by the World Bank country classification lists.  In this study, eight 
African, nine Asian, one European, and sixteen Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have been selected for our data base to reduce the regional biases that may 
arise in this type of studies. This study also covers 15 severely indebted, 12 
moderately indebted and 7 low debt countries. Table 1 gives the list of the countries 
included in this study and their group classifications according to The World Bank 
Tables. 
This study uses the World Bank data sets. The annual values for each economic 
indicator are obtained mainly from the Global Development Finance data diskettes 
of the Bank.  The database of this study has 408 observations. There are 110 
rescheduling observations which make up 27 percent of total observations. This 
represents a relatively rich data set on country debt rescheduling. Out of thirty-four, 
six countries have not experienced any rescheduling in the time period of 1986 to 
1998. These countries are India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
The remaining twenty-eight countries have experienced rescheduling in various 
degrees and years.   
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3. Indicators of the Country Risk Assessment Model 
Like many other empirical studies, this study also adopts the view that the 
demand for debt rescheduling, or alternatively, debt restructuring, represents a debt 
repayment problem for a country and, therefore, a risk for lenders. Since country 
defaults no longer exist, we attempt to measure country default risk by using 
country debt rescheduling risk as a proxy. In other words, since country default is 
not an observable variable, debt rescheduling is substituted in the estimation of debt 
servicing capacity. Place (1989) points out some problems with such a change. 
First, debt servicing difficulty need not result in a rescheduling agreement. Second, 
some rescheduling agreements are not made public, so that we may face hidden 
information. Third, there may be a considerable length of time between the problem 
of debt servicing and the announcement of a rescheduling agreement. Nevertheless, 
debt rescheduling, or structuring, indicates that a country is experiencing severe 
difficulties in servicing its external debt. As a result, rating sovereign borrowers, 
according to their debt rescheduling risk makes sense for lenders who do not want 
to be involved in the long and extremely painful process of debt rescheduling.  
As we mentioned earlier, a year-ahead ratio of total debt rescheduling to total 
external debt, TR(+1)EDT, is the dependent variable used in this study. It will be 
called the rescheduling ratio in the remaining text. In the existing literature, the 
analyses focuses only when rescheduling took place; thus the rescheduling event is 
a binary dependent variable taking the values of zero and one. However, this study 
extends the literature by modeling the actual rescheduling ratios that are negotiated 
so that a two percent rescheduling ratio is actually treated as a different event from 
a ten percent ratio. As a result, this study focuses on the total amount of debt 
rescheduled in estimation of country risk and estimates the relative size of debt 
rescheduling. 
In order to determine the factors responsible for debt rescheduling, that in turn, 
determine country rescheduling risk in external borrowing, this study uses a total of 
six economic variables. These variables are defined in table 2 and listed in table 3 
with their expected signs.   
The first variable, the interest payment to export ratio, (INT XGS), is a 
traditional indicator of creditworthiness, which is used in many country risk studies. 
This ratio, also called the interest service ratio, is obtained by dividing the total 
interest payments to exports of goods and services, including worker's remittances,  
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in a given year. Together with amortization, the interest service ratio itself is 
sometimes used as a rule of thumb for country risk assessments and seen as a single 
most important factor driving sovereign borrowers into debt rescheduling process. 
Therefore, a high interest service ratio indicates a heavy burden on the economic 
resources of a country and increases rescheduling risk.  
The second indicator in determining the debt capacity of sovereign borrowers or 
country rescheduling risk is the ratio of concessional loans to total debt stock, 
(CEDT). Concessional long-term loans are defined by the World Bank as loans 
with a grant element of 25 percent or more. The grant element of a loan is the grant 
equivalent expressed as a percentage of the amount committed, and it is used to 
measure the overall cost of borrowing. The grant equivalent of a loan is its 
commitments (present) value, less the discounted present value of its contractual 
debt service; conventionally, future service payments are discounted at 10 percent. 
So, the ratio of concessional long-term loans to total debt stock is a significant 
variable to measure the effect of borrowing cost on total rescheduling demand of 
borrowers. The expected sign of this variable is negative. 
The third indicator is the total reserves to total debt ratio, (RES EDT).  Foreign 
reserves serve as a buffer against sudden adverse shocks and indicates the liquidity 
capacity of a sovereign borrower. Reserves are the sum of a country’s monetary 
authority’s holdings of special drawing rights (SDRs), its reserve position in the 
IMF, its holdings of foreign exchange, and gold.  A strong international reserve 
position shows the ability to respond to foreign currency demands in cases of 
adverse shocks.  So with a larger ratio of reserve to total debt, one excepts higher 
debt servicing capacity and less need to demand a rescheduling over external 
obligations. Therefore, the expected sign of this coefficient is negative.  
The fourth indicator used to explain rescheduling behavior in the model is the 
ratio of total debt stock to gross national product, (EDT GNP).  This indicator 
represents the debt burden on a sovereign borrower. We expect a positive 
correlation between debt burden and debt rescheduling.  If a country’s debt stock 
increases relative to its GNP, the likelihood of debt rescheduling increases. In such 
situations debtor countries would have difficulties in servicing  external obligations 
according to a payment schedule.   
The fifth variable of the study is the private debt to total debt ratio (PRV EDT). 
Presumable a country with well established private sector and high ratio of private  
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debt to total debt is less likely to default or ask for debt rescheduling than 
otherwise. This indicator has a negative expected sign.   
The last variable is the one-period lagged dependent variable, (TR EDT), the 
ratio of debt rescheduling to total external debt.  Once a debtor plunges into the debt 
crisis and reschedules her debt, she will probably find itself in difficulty to service 
the future debt obligations in the following years. In such situations debtors will 
also have difficulties to obtain new credits from international creditors. This seems 
to be the main reason why most governments remain extremely reluctant to 
dishonor their external debts. The recent Asian crisis is a good example of such 
behavior. Only two countries out of many severely affected, made rescheduling.   
Hence, the model to estimate is  
TR (t+1)EDT  =  INT XGS(t) + CEDT (t)  + RESEDT(t)  
+ EDTGNP(t)  + PRVEDT(t)+ TREDT(t)    (1) 
Since the dependent variable takes a value of only between zero or one, the 
appropriate model to estimate is a two-limit Tobit model (described in Appendix 1).  
The purpose of using one-period lagged values of the explanatory variables is to 
make the model serve as a early-warning model of country riskiness.  As a result of 
such setup, the estimates of rescheduling ratio for the next year (t+1) are obtained 
by utilizing values of the explanatory variables in the present year (t).  In another 
words, the model is aimed to predict future debt servicing capacity of the selected 
countries a-year in advance.   
4. Estimation Results 
The parameter estimates of the two-limit Tobit model are shown in Table 4.  All 
the variables used to estimate the debt rescheduling are found to be statistically 
significant at 10 percent level. Excluding EDTGNP, the variables are even 
significant at 5 percent level. Out of six variables, private debt ratio, PRVEDT, and  
previous debt rescheduling ratio, TREDT,  have high coefficient values that indicate 
effectiveness on coming year rescheduling size and behavior. The signs of the 
parameters are also in line with model predictions. Concessional terms on loans, 
high international reserves, and high degree of private sector establishment in 
debtor country are factors reducing the debt rescheduling likelihood and the amount 
of the proportion of rescheduled debt in the following year. On the contrary, interest  
 
 
Timur Han Gür /Central Bank Review 1(2001) 49-68  55
payment burden over exports of goods and services, accumulated debt burden over 
GNP and previous debt service difficulties increase the likelihood of debt 
rescheduling risk a year later.       
In order to construct a credibility index which is similar to indexes of the rating 
agencies, for the sample countries, the predicted rescheduling ratios are grouped 
into 10 subgroups according to their size. Also, in constructing a risk index, current 
ratings are made sensitive to the previous debt reschedulings. As a result, both the 
estimated size and the period of previous reschedulings are taking into account. 
These subgroups and their assigned weights are given in Table 5. 
Each country has a total scores of 100 at the beginning of each year and any 
increase in their estimated rescheduling ratio make them lose some points 
depending upon the size of the rescheduling ratio. This is an adaptive weighting 
method and only the last four years are weighed in the scoring for a given year. In 
order to calculate the creditworthiness score and grade, both the year coefficients 
and the rescheduling range coefficients are used. The year coefficients range 
between 1 and 4, and the rescheduling ratio coefficients range between 0 and 10.  
The grades assigned are similar to Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s and range 
between (AAA), which represents extremely strong capacity to service external 
obligations and (C) the lowest payment capacities and almost certain likelihood of 
debt payment problems and (F), a definite default probability.  
5. Estimated Country Risk and Grades 
In this section we test the accuracy and the predictability of our model. For this 
reason no-rescheduling and major rescheduling cases are examined between 1990 
and 1998.  If the model is able to identify high-risk countries and low-risk countries 
correctly, then one may conclude that the model is successful in assessing country 
risk.  
Table 6 shows accuracy levels reached in our estimates for eleven countries, 
which have never exercised a debt rescheduling in the period 1988-1998.  For these 
countries, the size of estimated rescheduling reaches up to only 4 percent in the 
cases of India in 1993 and Turkey in 1994.  Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
and Tunisia are the other no-rescheduling countries and their highest estimated 
rescheduling ratios are less than 3 percent in our model. So, the differences between 
the estimated ratios and actual rescheduling ratios are very small and these low-risk  
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countries are successfully identified in our country-risk system. As a result, we can 
argue that our method of country-scoring has been successful in estimating the high 
credibility of some countries and has produced very low type II errors.  
Table 7 presents the major debt reschedulings of the sample countries and the in-
sample predictions of our model. In predictions, both estimated rescheduling ratios 
and the country credit scores for the last three years before the rescheduling are 
considered for eleven sample countries. The table basically checks type I errors for 
fourteen major rescheduling cases.  The results indicate that many major 
reschedulings are predicted very well in advance in our model. Considering the 
predictions in a one-year horizon for more than 10 percent rescheduling, our model 
fails to assign correct grades only in the Korean case in 1998.  In this case, the 
estimated rescheduling ratio is only 1 percent and grade BB is given to Korea in 
1997, 1996, 1995.  In fact, Korea exercised a major rescheduling in 1998.   
As we will discuss the Korean case later in detail, our model still seems to 
predict the rescheduling risk of Korea better than the others since her grade is 
downgraded from BBB in 1994 and kept in a speculative grade BB until 1998.  
However, the model correctly estimates all other major-reschedulings with two-year 
lead time in general. In many cases, B or lower grades, indicating extremely high 
risk, are given to some sample countries, which actually succumbed into the debt 
payment crises in later years. The estimates are even more precise considering the 
credit scores with one-year lead time. Out of fourteen major rescheduling cases, the 
model assigns six C grades and eight B grades indicating extremely high risk and 
warning creditors one-year in advance. So, our credit-scoring method is very 
accurate and easily identifies the future debt-service problems in the sample 
countries in advance with only few exceptions. We can conclude that our credit-
scoring method has also been very successful in reaching low type I error ratio. In 
some exceptional cases, these countries had good economic conditions until sudden 
changes. The very sudden adverse external shocks and some political factors might 
be responsible for these developments.  
Table 8 and Table 9 include the Institutional Investors, the Euromoney, Standard 
& Poor’s, and Moody’s long-term foreign currency risk ratings before and during 
the Asian crisis to compare the accuracy of our credit-scoring method. In fact, note 
that the scores are not directly comparable due to different sample sizes and scoring 
techniques. However, the ranking of the sample countries from low-risk to high-risk 
by the agencies are comparable.   
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As table 8 indicates, our scores assess the debt rescheduling risk reasonably well 
for many countries including nine Asian countries. Thailand, Sri Lanka, Paraguay, 
Malaysia and Chile ranked with the highest grade in the sample with BBB 
according to our methodology. These countries did not exercise any debt 
rescheduling as predicted by the model.  But, Egypt and China with the same grade 
BBB had a very minor rescheduling with the magnitude of debt restructuring 
ranging between 0.002 and 0.06 percent, in 1997 or 1998. According to Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s rating, Korea, Malaysia, China, Chile, Thailand and 
Indonesia were the lowest-risk countries in 1997 with grades AA or BBB.   
However, Korea, Indonesia, China rescheduled in 1998.  
In case of Korea which rescheduled 15 percent of total debt in 1998, S&P and 
Moody’s assigned AA- and A1 ratings respectively, the highest grades among 34 
sample countries in 1997 right before the Asian crisis. On contrary, receiving BB 
and B grades respectively, Korea and Indonesia are found to be moderate and high-
risk countries by our model in 1997. As we mentioned earlier, Korea was 
downgraded in 1994 from BBB to BB and put into the risky category. The 
difference between risk assigned to Korea by us and the rating agencies indicates 
that the East-Asian countries are clearly overrated by the rating agencies despite the 
fact that political variables as well as many economical variables are examined 
regularly by the rating agencies. However, our model is constructed on the basis of 
fundamental debt ratios and do not consider political factors in its grading system. 
Despite the lack of political risk, our scoring system reflects country risk very 
accurately even in a three-year horizon. Especially major debt reschedulings and 
their relative sizes are anticipated and pointed out in earlier years. 
On the other hand, the majority of the high-risk countries assigned with C grades 
in our model, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru and Algeria made 
reschedulings in either 1997 or 1998 or both years as predicted a-year earlier by us.  
For example the countries graded with CC, Algeria and Nicaragua, rescheduled 
debt in both 1997 and 1998. Peru and Ecuador are the two other countries assigned 
with CCC rescheduled their debt as predicted correctly by our model. Five out of 
nineteen countries in our sample assigned with B grade made debt rescheduling at 
various degrees. The most striking result founded in comparing country grades of 
the major rating agencies with ours is the grades assigned to Korea and Indonesia 
during the Asian financial crisis which resulted in major debt rescheduling. In 1998, 
Korea is rated with BB+ by S&P and Ba1 by Moody’s which are better grades than  
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many no-rescheduling countries. Similarly, Indonesia’s grade is determined as 
CCC+ and B3 by S&P and Moody’s respectively. On the other hand, Turkey, which 
is one of the few countries that has not faced any debt repayment problems over the 
last twenty years is wrongly undergraded with B and B1 by S&P and Moody’s. 
Comparing with the grades given to Korea and Indonesia by these agencies, the 
grades assigned to Turkey is the lowest grades among the sample countries in 1998, 
a year of Asian crisis. 
Peru is another example of overrating.  In our model, Peru properly received 
CCC in 1997 and made a 15 percent rescheduling in 1998. However, both S&P and 
Moody’s rated Peru with BB and Ba3 respectively. With such grades Peru is rated 
over Turkey, Paraguay, Venezuela, India, Indonesia and many other countries. In 
addition to Turkey, some other countries Paraguay, Venezuela, India, Indonesia 
receive relatively low scores, although no rescheduling, or very small size 
reschedulings are exercised in 1997 and 1998. Such examples of over and 
underrating have not yet found explanations to anybody’s satisfaction.  
The difference between credit scores can be attributed to political concerns. The 
political risk has not been our particular concern; while, the country scores of the 
rating agencies assigned weights to political observations. Therefore, some ratings 
and country scores of the popular agencies are basically the reflection of political 
concerns of the Western financial institutions toward some countries.  
Despite the high level of accuracy reached in our credit-scoring method, overall 
results also verify the fact that any credibility index should be accompanied with 
expert opinions. The highest level of accuracy can be reached in country risk 
analysis if the most efficient quantitative methodology is used in conjunction with 
the qualitative scoring methodology, in which political and social-economical 
factors are considered in sovereign rating. Our index scores are broad, therefore, 
country-specific and time-specific conditions in sovereign scoring should be 
evaluated by country experts in order to revise scores and grades. Such final 
touches will definitely improve the prediction quality.  Nonetheless, the index has 
worked very well for many countries in our sample with only few exceptions for 
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6. Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to create a better method for estimating the risk that a 
country might reschedule the payments on its external debt. The increasing 
uncertainties in the borrowers capacity to repay their loans have raised the risk 
awareness of lenders in the past two decades. This paper examines the existing 
literature on country risk analysis, and develops an efficient, alternative risk 
assessment model by using a panel data set for the 1986 - 1998 period for 34 
nations. 
In the existing literature, the majority of the analyses focus on the rescheduling 
event. However, this study extends the literature by modeling the actual 
rescheduling ratios that are negotiated so that a two percent rescheduling ratio is 
actually treated as a different event from a twenty percent ratio. In fact, 
rescheduling and rescheduling ratios have a very high correlation, but, since the size 
of debt rescheduling conveys more information about sovereign borrowers risk, the 
rescheduling ratio is obviously found to be a better proxy than binary rescheduling 
values in the assessment of country risk. Therefore, the country risk table developed 
in this study reflects more a accurate credit scorings for the sample countries since 
it ranks the sovereign borrowers according to the amount of debt reschedulings.   
It is found that not all the debt payment difficulties resulted in a rescheduling 
agreement. The best example of such situation is the recent Asian crisis.  Despite 
severe economic conditions and debt service difficulties, Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
Philippines, Malaysia did not exercise any rescheduling as Korea and Indonesia did. 
For some countries, with relatively low rescheduling ratios, the cost of rescheduling 
is much more formidable than the benefits they accrue. However, the countries that 
do reschedule their debt in small size generally face chronic economic difficulties.   
This study compares the estimated country creditworthiness obtained from an 
econometric model with other risk indexes constructed by the rating institutions. It 
is found that our credit scores reflect creditworthiness more accurately than some 
others since borrowers are correctly ranked and graded as a result of the emphasis 
given to the relative size of debt rescheduling. However, in order to measure the 
effects of sudden changes and turning points and to reflect them in country risk 
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Table 1 
Sample Countries 
  COUNTRIES  By Income  By Location  By Indebtedness 
1 ALGERIA  Middle  Africa  Severely  Indebted 
2 ARGENTINA  Middle  America  Severely  Indebted 
3 BOLIVIA  Middle  America  Severely  Indebted 
4 BRAZIL  Middle  America  Severely  Indebted 
5 CHILE  Middle  America  Moderately  Indebted 
6 CHINA  Low  Asia  Low  Debt 
7 COLOMBIA  Middle  America  Moderately  Indebted 
8  COSTA RICA  Middle  America  Moderately Indebted 
9  COT'S IVORY  Middle  Africa  Severely Indebted 
10  DOMINICAN REP.  Middle  America  Moderately Indebted 
11 ECUADOR  Middle  America  Severely  Indebted 
12 EGYPT  Low  Africa  Severely  Indebted 
13 INDIA  Low  Asia  Moderately  Indebted 
14 INDONESIA  Low  Asia  Moderately  Indebted 
15 JAMAICA  Middle  America  Severely  Indebted 
16 KENYA  Low  Africa  Severely  Indebted 
17  KOREA, SOUTH  Middle  Asia  Low Debt 
18 MALAYSIA  Middle  Asia  Low  Debt 
19 MEXICO  Middle  America  Severely  Indebted 
20 MOROCCO  Middle  Africa  Severely  Indebted 
21 NICARAGUA  Low  America  Low  Debt 
22 NIGERIA  Low  Africa  Severely  Indebted 
23 PAKISTAN  Low  Asia  Moderately  Indebted 
24 PANAMA  Middle  America  Severely  Indebted 
25 PARAGUAY  Middle  America  Low  Debt 
26 PERU  Middle  America  Severely  Indebted 
27 PHILIPPINES  Middle  Asia  Moderately  Indebted 
28  SRI LANKA  Low  Asia  Low Debt 
29 SUDAN  Low  Africa  Severely  Indebted 
30 THAILAND  Middle  Asia  Low  Debt 
31 TUNISIA  Middle  Africa  Moderately  Indebted 
32 TURKEY  Middle  Europe  Moderately  Indebted 
33 URUGUAY  Middle  America  Moderately  Indebted 
34 VENEZUELA  Middle  America  Moderately  Indebted 
Source: The World Bank, World Debt Tables. 
•   Classification of the sample countries are made according to World Bank Classification Tables 
given in World Bank Debt Tables.  
•   The low-income countries in this study are those in which 1992 GNP per capita was no more than $ 
675, and middle income countries are those in which GNP per capita was more than $ 675 and less than 
$ 8,359. 
•   According to the Bank, a country will be in the severely indebted country's group if one of the key is 
above critical level.  These ratios and their critical levels are present value of debt service to GNP and 
present value of debt service to exports of goods and all services. Their critical levels are 80 percent and 
200 percent respectively. The critical levels of the same ratios are 48-80 percent and 132-220 percent for 
moderately indebted countries.   
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Table 2 
Variables and Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
EDT 
Total debt stock 
Sum of public and publicly guaranteed long term external debt, 
private non-guaranteed long term debt, the use of IMF credit, and 
short-term debt (estimated). 
INT 
Interest payments 
Actual amounts of interest paid in foreign currency, goods, or services 
in the year specified. 
XGS 
Exports 
Exports of goods and services in the year specified. 
C 
Concessional loans 




the sum of a country’s monetary authority’s holdings of special 
drawing rights (SDRs), its reserve position in the IMF, its holdings of 
foreign exchange, and its holdings of gold (valued at year-end London 
prices), 
PRV 
Private sector LDOD  
the distribution of long-term debt by private debtors including private 
banks   
TR 
Debt Stock Rescheduled 
amount of debt outstanding rescheduled in any given year 
 
Table 3 
Indicators of Country Rescheduling Risk and Expected Coefficient Signs 
     Ratio of interest payments on external debt to export   INT XGS  + 
     Ratio of concesional loans received to total debt  C EDT  - 
     Ratio of reserves to total debt  RES EDT  - 
     Ratio of total debt stock to GNP  EDT GNP  + 
     Ratio of private long term debt to total debt stock  PRV EDT  - 
     Ratio of Previous Total Rescheduling to total debt stock  TR EDT  + 
 
Table 4 
Parameter Estimates of the Two-Limit Tobit Model of Debt Rescheduling Risk 
Variable  Coefficient    Std.Error   b/St.Er.  P[|Z|>z  Mean of X| 
INTXGS       0.0065  0.0014    4.728    .0000   11.15 
CEDT       -0.0014    0.0056    -2.577    .0100   21.35 
RESEDT     -0.0015    0.0006    -2.324    .0201   19.17 
EDTGNP       0.0001    0.00007    1.619    .1054   87.18 
PRVEDT     -0.2478    0.1238    -2.001    .0453   0.078 
TREDT       0.2497    0.0897    2.783    .0054   0.038 
Constant   -0.0751    0.0296    -2.532    .0113   
Sigma       0.15    0.0087    17.171    .0000   
        
Observations   408           
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Table 5  
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Table 6  
No Rescheduling Countries and Their Highest Estimated Rescheduling Ratios, 1990-1998  
COUNTRIES Estimated  Highest 
Rescheduling Ratio * 
1972-1991 
Year 
INDIA 0.04  1993 
MALAYSIA 0.01  1998 
PAKISTAN 0.02  1998 
SRI LANKA  0.01  1997 
THAILAND 0.01  1998 
TUNISIA 0.03  1994 
TURKEY 0.04  1994 
* The actual rescheduling ratios for these countries are zero obviously. 
 
Table 7 















ALGERIA  1994  0.16 0.06 CC  CC  CC 
  1995  0.17 0.07 CC  CC  CC 
  1996  0.11 0.08 CC  CC  CC 
ARGENTINA  1993  0.39 0.11 CC  CC  N.A 
BRAZIL  1992  0.11 0.04 CCC  CC  B 
COT'S  IVORY  1997  0.13 0.04 B  B  CCC 
DOMINICAN  REP.  1994  0.11 0.03 B  B  B 
ECUADOR 1995  0.39 0.05 B  CCC  CC 
KOREA,  S  1998  0.15 0.01 BB  BB  BB 
NICARAGUA  1996  0.08 0.07 C  F  F 
PANAMA  1996  0.53 0.05 B  B  B 
PERU  1996  0.19 0.03 B  B  CCC 
  1998  0.15 0.07 B  CCC  B 
PHILIPPINES  1992  0.14 0.04 B  CCC  N.A 
* The grades  A, B, and C indicate the low risk, speculative risk, and extremely high, almost certain, 
likelihood of debt reschedulings respectively. Any country with grade BB or lower should be considered 
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Table 8 
1997 Credit Ratings:  Gur, The Institutional Investor, S&P, Moody’s 

















1 ALGERIA  CCC  24.5      0.07  0.02 
2 ARGENTINA CCC  41.3  BB  Ba3  0  0 
3 BOLIVIA  B  26.2  BB-   0.06  0 
4 BRAZIL  B  39.5  BB- B1  0.002  0.001 
5 CHILE  BBB  63.5  A-  Baa1  0  0 
6 CHINA  BBB  57.8  BBB+  A3  0.06  0 
7  COLOMBIA B 47.2  BBB-  Baa3  0  0 
8 COSTA  RICA B  36.0  BB  Ba1  0  0 
9 COT'S  IVORY  B  20.1      0.13  0.02 
10 DOMIN.  REP.  B  24.8  B+  B1  0.03  0.014 
11 ECUADOR  B  26.3    B1  0.004  0 
12 EGYPT  BBB  39.7  BBB- Ba1  0.005  0.002 
13 INDIA  B  46.9  BB+  Baa3  0  0 
14 INDONESIA  B  51.8  BBB- Ba1  0  0.03 
15 JAMAICA  B  29.7      0  0 
16 KENYA  B  28.6    Ba3  0  0 
17 KOREA,  S.  BB  69.7  AA-  A1  0  0.15 
18 MALAYSIA  BBB  66.7  A+  A2  0  0 
19 MEXICO  B  43.5  BB  Ba2  0  0 
20 MOROCCO  B  40.9      0  0 
21 NICARAGUA  CC  13.5      0.08  0.02 
22 NIGERIA  B  15.3      0  0 
23 PAKISTAN  B  27.5  B+  B2  0  0 
24 PANAMA  CCC  33.6  BB+  Baa1  0  0 
25 PARAGUAY  BBB  33.5  BB-    0  0 
26 PERU  B  33.7  BB    0.03  0.15 
27 PHILIPPINES  B  44.3  BB+  Ba1  0  0 
28 SRI  LANKA  BBB  32.1      0  0 
29 SUDAN  B  9.1      0  0 
30 THAILAND  BBB  59.9  A    0  0 
31 TUNISIA  B  47.9  BBB- Baa3  0  0 
32 TURKEY  B  38.6  B  B1  0  0 
33 URUGUAY  B  43.4  BBB- Baa3  0  0 
34 VENEZUELA  B  35.4  B+  Ba2  0  0  
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Table 9 
Credit Ratings 1998:  Gur, The Euromoney, S&P, Moody’s 
















1 ALGERIA  CC  26      0.07  0.02 
2 ARGENTINA  CCC  45  BB  Ba3  0  0 
3  BOLIVIA  B 35 BB-  B1  0.06  0 
4  BRAZIL  B 36 BB-  B2  0.002 0.001 
5 CHILE  BBB  59  A-  Baa1  0  0 
6 CHINA  BBB  48  BBB+  A3  0.06  0 
7  COLOMBIA  B 46 BBB-  Baa3  0  0 
8  COSTA  RICA  B 40 BB  Ba1  0  0 
9  COT'S  IVORY  B 30     0.13  0.02 
10  DOMIN.  REP.  B 22 B+  B1  0.03  0.014 
11 ECUADOR  CCC 28    B3  0.004  0 
12 EGYPT  BBB 43  BBB-  Ba1  0.005  0.002 
13  INDIA  B 39 BB+  Ba2  0  0 
14  INDONESIA  B 27 CCC+  B3  0  0.03 
15  JAMAICA B 43   Ba3  0  0 
16  KENYA  B 25     0  0 
17 KOREA,  S.  BB  64  BB+  Ba1  0  0.15 
18 MALAYSIA  BBB 42  BBB-  Baa3  0  0 
19  MEXICO  B 45 BB  Ba2  0  0 
20  MOROCCO  B 41 BB  Ba1  0  0 
21 NICARAGUA CC  24    B2  0.08  0.02 
22  NIGERIA  B 17     0  0 
23  PAKISTAN  B 19 CCC-  Caa1  0  0 
24 PANAMA  CCC 50  BB+  Baa1  0  0 
25 PARAGUAY  BBB 31  BB-  B2  0  0 
26 PERU  CCC 40  BB  Ba3  0.03  0.15 
27  PHILIPPINES  B 40 BB+  Ba1  0  0 
28 SRI  LANKA  BBB 28      0  0 
29 SUDAN  B  7      0  0 
30 THAILAND  BBB 41  BBB-  Ba1  0  0 
31  TUNISIA  B 46 BBB-    0  0 
32  TURKEY  B 39 B  B1  0  0 
33  URUGUAY  B 46 BBB-  Baa3  0  0 
34  VENEZUELA  B 30 B+  B2  0  0  
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Apppendix 1 
Censored and Truncated Regression Models: The Tobit Model 
This section presents the censored regression model (or the Tobit model). Suppose that we 
consider a sample size n and record only those values of the dependent variable greater than a 
constant  c. The resulting sample based on such criterion is called a censored sample. 
However, if the sample is truncated before actual selection is made, then, a sample from this 
truncated normal distribution is called a truncated sample. Amemiya (1984) surveys the 
Tobit models by classifying them into five basic types according to the form of the likelihood 
function, and states that basic estimation methods can be applied to any of the five types with 
a slight modifications. In the next sections, two-limit Tobit model are reviewed. If dependent 
variable is subject to both an upper limit and a lower limit two-limit Tobit model is used 
rather than standard Tobit model. 
Two-Limit Tobit (Probit) Model 
In the next section of this study, the debt rescheduling ratios are estimated with 
use of alternative models. In analyzing the debt repayment crises, we estimate the 
relative size of debt rescheduling and use the debt rescheduling ratio which is 
bounded with 1 and zero as a dependent variable. Two-limit Tobit is the most 
appropriate framework in the cases that economic variables are restricted by an 
upper and lower limit but are continuous between the two limits. The two-limit 
Tobit (Probit) regression model and its estimation method is given in Rosett & 
Nelson (1975). In this section, we follow this paper closely. According to the 
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* is a linear function of the independent variables Xt . The aim is to 
estimate the unknown parameters, 







where the subscript, t, distinguishes observations and its application to the limits L1 
and  L2 means that these limits are permitted to vary among observations. The 
random variable e  is assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and  
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standard deviation σ . If the non-limit values are known, the maximum likelihood 




































where P is the normal cumulative probability distribution, Q = 1-P,  and Z is the 
normal density function. The sample has been partitioned into three parts, S1, 
S2,and  S3, for lower limit, upper limit, and non-limit observations respectively. 
After some simplifications, the likelihood function becomes 
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and the unknown parameter can be obtained by maximization of this function.  
Differentiating this likelihood function yields non-linear normal equations so that 
the solutions for the estimates are not obtainable. Thus, some iterative 
maximization procedure must be employed. The ordinary least square estimates are 
biased but in many cases they may provide adequate initial values where the values 
of Y for the non-limit observations are known. In such cases, applying the OLS to 
just non-limit observations yields better estimates. Alternatively, Tobin suggests a 
process to linearizing the normal equations. Tobin (1958), and Rosett & Nelson 
(1975) discuss the process in details. 